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	 absTraCT
The concept of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) has gained increasing 
popularity in the conservation literature as it offers the potential to reconcile opposing social 
and ecological objectives by paying land owners for the positive environmental externalities they 
generate on their land. Based on extensive fieldwork in Matiguás, Nicaragua, this paper aims to 
complement the literature on locally-financed PES schemes in agricultural watersheds. Using 
both qualitative and quantitative research approaches, it inquires into the under-researched 
demand-side potential by assessing local willingness to pay (WTP) for water and watershed 
services in an upstream-downstream setting. Our results show a significant WTP for improved 
water services and a clear local consciousness about upstream-downstream interdependen-
cies, suggesting potential for a ‘Coasean’ water-related PES scheme. Contrary to expectations, 
the feasibility of such a locally-financed PES system is however undermined by prevailing local 
perceptions of agricultural externalities and entitlements, questioning the fairness of such pay-
ments. Also low levels of mutual trust seem to undermine the credibility of the PES framework. 
The viability and acceptance of locally-financed PES mechanisms will thus also depend on the 
prior social production of cognitive synergies and improved collective action. 
Key words: Payments for Environmental Services (PES), watershed, willingness to 
pay (WTP), externalities, institutions, fairness
	 absTraIT
Le concept des Paiements pour les Services Environnementaux (PSE) gagne de plus 
en plus en popularité dans la littérature écologique, puisqu’il offre la possibilité de réconcilier 
des objectifs sociaux et écologiques opposés en rémunérant les propriétaires fonciers pour les 
externalités écologiques positives qu’ils génèrent sur leurs terres. Basé sur des études de terrain 
extensives réalisées à Matiguás au Nicaragua, ce travail contribue à l’analyse des programmes 
de PSE financés localement dans les bassins-versants agricoles. En adoptant une approche à la 
fois qualitative et quantitative, il complète la littérature existante en investiguant la demande 
potentielle pour ces programmes et en évaluant le montant que les habitants seraient prêts 
à payer pour un meilleur accès à l’eau potable. Nous observons une propension à payer (PAP) 
importante doublée d’une prise de conscience locale relative aux interdépendances amont-aval. 
Nos résultats montrent donc la pertinence de l’approche ‘coasienne’ des PSE dans le domaine 
de la fourniture d’eau. Néanmoins, la mise en place d’un tel système de PSE, financé localement, 
s’avère compromise par la perception locale des externalités agricoles et des droits de propriété 
foncière, suscitant des interrogations sur la légitimité de tels paiements. En outre, le déficit de 
confiance mutuelle nuit à la crédibilité des PSE. En conséquence, la viabilité et l’acceptabilité des 
PSE financés localement dépendront de l’existence préalable de synergies cognitives et d’une 
coordination sociale renforcée. 
Mots-clés : Paiement pour les Services Environnementaux (PSE), bassin-versants, 
propension à payer (PAP), externalités, institutions, équité.
Cette recherche a été financée par une bourse de doctorat du Conseil Interuniversitaire 
Flamand (VLIR-UOS, Belgique), et une aide complémentaire de l’Université de Fairfield (USA).
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	1.	 InTroduCTIon
The main causes of environmental degradation are often conceptualized in eco-
nomic terms, and more specifically as the production of negative environmental externalities 
in the form of unintended by-products of economic activities which are not accounted for in the 
market and therefore tend to be ignored in private decision making (Pagiola et al., 2002; Pearce, 
1993; Pearce, 2004). As agricultural activities count among the main direct causes of tropical 
deforestation and biodiversity loss (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998), while concurrently having 
the capacity to contribute to their reversal, increasing attention has been directed to farmers as 
potential protectors and providers instead of destroyers of both non-renewable and renewable 
natural resources (Hanley et al., 1998). This paradigm shift is increasingly reflected in global 
debates on climate change, such as ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Deg-
radation’ (REDD) (Harvey et al., 2010), and has led to growing research and implementation 
of mechanisms known as ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES), which explicitly focus 
on remunerating the production of positive environmental externalities (Engel et al., 2008; Pa-
giola et al., 2002; Wunder, 2005). As governmental regulatory approaches (often referred to as 
command-and-control measures) or more community-based integrated conservation and de-
velopment projects (ICDPs) and educational approaches on their own have often proven to be 
ineffective in halting further degradation (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ferraro, 2001; Pagiola et 
al., 2002, Wunder, 2005), PES could be a valuable complementary instrument in assuring more 
effective environmental governance (Engel et al., 2008). The premises of this innovative conser-
vation approach are appealing, as it seems to offer a win-win situation for complex ecological 
and socio-economic problems. 
The PES approach mainly banks on the metaphor of ecosystem stocks as providers 
of environmental or ecosystem services (ES), delivering huge benefits to society (Costanza et 
al., 1997; MA, 2005; Norgaard, 2010). The core idea is that private landowners, who in normal 
circumstances -i.e. in the absence of direct incentives- are poorly or not motivated to protect 
or reproduce natural resources on their land, will do so if they receive direct payments from ES 
buyers, which at least cover the landowners’ opportunity costs of exploiting the land otherwise 
(Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2002; Wunder, 2005). Rather than ineffective sanctioning 
of ‘bad behaviour’, PES argues that the beneficiaries of the positive externalities should pay for 
their provision by farmers. Although the original conceptualisation of PES recently has been the 
subject of criticism from various angles (see below), the dominant literature still builds upon 
Wunder’s (2005: 3) definition of PES as a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES is being 
‘bought’ by an ES buyer from an ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision. 
These initial PES ideas reveal a predominantly Coasean conceptual basis, as it assumes that 
under low transaction costs and clearly-defined property rights problems of externalities can 
be overcome through private negotiation between affected parties (Coase, 1960; Engel et al., 
2008).
Although most current pilot PES programs are (temporarily) financed by govern-
ments or communities (Vatn, 2010), it is important to note that Wunder’s PES definition builds 
on a market-governance model, as it aims to change individual decision making by means of 
price incentives, allegedly avoiding impracticable prohibition and half-hearted motivational 
change (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010a). McAfee and Shapiro 
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(2010) and McCarthy and Prudham (2004) associate this pro-market promotion with the rise 
of neoliberal discourse within supranational environmental policy-making institutions, which is 
matched by rhetorical marketing claims of the dominant PES literature that unattractive regu-
lated nature conservation should be converted into alluring private business transactions (Bish-
op et al., 2009; Wunder and Vargas, 2005). Indeed, scarcity of public funds make some authors 
argue that the demand side of the market might be further developed in the future (Wunder et 
al., 2008: 851), thereby allowing society ‘to give the invisible hand of free market economics a 
green thumb’ (Wilson, 1993: 283, as cited by Pattanayak, 2004: 183).
Simultaneously it is recognised that in order to have a sustainable flow of ES, PES 
programs generally need ongoing, rather than finite payments[1] (Pagiola et al., 2002). As such, 
long-term funds must be encountered in order to turn current pilot projects into sustainable 
PES systems. One possible way is to focus on the potential of international payments for envi-
ronmental services (IPES), whose main aim is ‘to build compensation mechanisms for ES whose 
benefits are enjoyed by those far removed from the place that generates the services’ (UNEP-
IUCN, 2006, as cited in Huberman, 2009: 458). The main idea of IPES is to complement the 
currently limited ES market initiatives by ‘a scaling-up of the core “upstream-downstream” PES 
model to fit into a “North-South” approach’, mainly in the realm of biodiversity conservation 
(Huberman, 2009: 458) and climate change mitigation. Although this conceptual idea is gaining 
global momentum (manifested most clearly in the ongoing REDD negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), the perspectives of finding sustainable 
long-term funding for ES still look bleak, especially in the short run. Budget-constrained govern-
ments in developing countries allocate only very limited funds to natural resource protection. 
Initial global funding mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), have 
also illustrated how difficult it is to realise IPES in practice, as they depend on limited funding, 
high transaction costs and strict rules and conditionality tied to funding (Farley et al., 2010; 
Krey, 2004; Thomas et al., 2010).   
Therefore, expectations for sustainable ‘fund-raising’ in the context of PES are 
frequently focused on local sources of funding and thus local demand for ES[2] (Pagiola et al., 
2007). Local user-financed mechanisms would be more efficient and sustainable than govern-
ment-financed mechanisms[3] (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2007; Wunder et al., 2008), and 
would be less vulnerable to volatile national and international political conditions (Blackman 
and Woodward, 2010: 1627). This local focus naturally directs attention to watershed services 
(as opposed to carbon or biodiversity services), since these offer the clearest and most valued 
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downstream externality framework (see Figure 1 for a schematic overview). Indeed, Engel et al. 
(2008) note that upstream-downstream watershed scenarios usually reflect situations in which 
it is easy to identify the users of ES (water resources) and arrange for them to pay. Continuous 
and qualitative water provision to water users therefore ‘constitutes a convenient lasting pay-
ment vehicle’ and would allow other more global benefits such as biodiversity conservation to 
‘piggyback on these more marketable forest services’ (Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009: 
585). In short, budget and transfer constraints often oblige PES implementers to focus on po-
tential local funds, and therefore local demand (Pagiola et al., 2007). Hence, ongoing research is 
increasingly exploring the potential of local payments for watershed services, and its prospects 
in securing long-term ecosystem protection (Ferraro; 2009; George et al., 2009; Johnson and 
Baltodano, 2004; Kosoy et al., 2007; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Ortega-Pacheco et al., 2009; 
Pagiola et al., 2002; Pagiola et al., 2010; Porras et al., 2008; Southgate and Wunder, 2009; 
Wunder and Albán, 2008).
Figure 1.  Externalities and PES on a watershed level
Source: Own elaboration based on Porras, 2003 
So far, however, few studies have explicitly focussed on demand-side aspects of 
locally-financed PES (Postel and Thompson, 2005). Johnson and Baltodano (2004) and Orte-
ga-Pacheco et al. (2009) assessed local rural households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for water-
shed PES in Nicaraguan and Costa Rican communities respectively, but both studies used small 
sample sizes, found quite diverging WTP results, and none of them explicitly dealt with broader 
institutional aspects. This paper attempts to fill this research gap by assessing local WTP for 
water and related hydrological PES schemes and by identifying and understanding the factors 
that determine this WTP. The empirical context of our study is the rural town of Matiguás in 
Nicaragua. As has already been argued from a supply-side perspective (Clements et al., 2010; 
Corbera et al., 2007a; Corbera et al., 2007b; Corbera et al., 2009; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 
2010a), our demand-side analysis will show that the feasibility of PES programs is mediated and 
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constrained by context-related factors (such as property rights or entitlements) within the local 
socio-institutional context, a claim which is increasingly recognised among PES practitioners 
and scholars, but still under-researched in the PES literature up to now (Muradian et al., 2010; 
Vatn, 2010). 
In the remainder of the paper, we first briefly introduce the study site and explain 
how we combined both qualitative and quantitative research approaches to assess the complex 
reality of environmental governance and the WTP of the local population for improved water 
delivery and watershed services (Section 2). Based on our qualitative research we then describe 
the socio-institutional context and the current approach to environmental governance in Mat-
iguás (Section 3). Subsequently we analyse the local WTP for a watershed PES program in Mat-
iguás with contingent valuation (CV) techniques (Section 4). The results of this exercise are then 
critically reassessed and discussed in a next section, mainly by contextualizing the result of the 
quantitative analysis within the local institutional background (Section 5). We end with some 
tentative conclusions.
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2.		 desCrIpTIon	of	The	sTudy	sITe	and	The	applIed	meThodologIes
2.1.   Study site
Our study site, the rural municipality of Matiguás, is located in the central Nicara-
guan department of Matagalpa, at about 140 km northeast of the capital Managua. The munici-
pality, which belongs to the so-called old agricultural frontier region (Maldidier and Marchetti, 
1996), contains two protected areas: the Sierra Quirragua (from now on referred to as ‘Quir-
ragua’) and about 30% of the Cerro Musún. It has an undulating terrain, with elevations in the 
Quirragua area of up to almost 1,400 metres above sea level. It knows a semi-humid tropical 
climate, with average temperature about 25-30°C and average annual rainfall 1,300-2,500 mm 
(Pagiola et al., 2007). The rainy season stretches from May to December. Besides the urban 
part of Matiguás, which lies at about 250 metres above sea level, the municipality exists of 26 
districts and 88 communities, which cover a total area of 1,710 km². In 2005 the population of 
urban Matiguás was estimated at around 9,000, living in about 2,300 houses. The rest of the 
population, about 32,000 people, lives in the rural areas of Matiguás (INIDE, 2005). Despite 
the steady economic development during the last decades, the municipality is still part of a re-
gion with a high degree of poverty (ibid). Life expectancy is about 65.5 years, and –though some 
improvements have been made during the last few years- at 41.5% in 2005, the illiteracy rate is 
still one of the highest in Nicaragua[1] (INIDE, 2005; Levard et al., 2001).
Until the beginning of the 20th Century, the area predominantly consisted of for-
ests. However, increasing colonisation of the area in search of pasture for cattle, both by peas-
ants and landlords related to the Somoza government, resulted in rapid deforestation from the 
1920s onwards (Maldidier and Marchetti, 1996). According to local estimations, during the last 
20 years alone, more than 40% of the forested area in Matiguás has been cut down. Most of its 
soils naturally possess a low water infiltration capacity and intensifying agricultural land use 
has further lowered this capacity, resulting in rivers running dry during the dry season and in 
uncontrolled run-off and surface water increases during the rainy season. Inappropriate agricul-
tural practices also pollute water sources with agrochemicals and organic contaminants. These 
activities have put increasing pressure on the drinking water supply in urban Matiguás, which 
currently depends on a system that captures water from the river Cusiles, which springs in the 
upstream natural reserve of Quirragua (northwest of urban Matiguás). Although the Quirragua 
area is a natural reserve, about 70% of its land is privately owned by farmers who mainly use the 
land for agricultural activities, such as the cultivation of corn, beans, and coffee, and pastures 
for cattle. The negative consequences of these upstream activities are locally perceived as an 
increasing threat to the downstream urban tap water supply, and a clear sign of the urgent need 
of more effective, negotiated environmental governance.
2.2.   Research methodologies
The assessment of local WTP for watershed services and how potential PES pro-
grams fit into local institutional contexts are complex inquiries, which require a combination of 
several research approaches. In our research we opted for a mixed method approach, combining 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative research, which assessed the institu-
[1]	 	As	shown	below	(table	1),	our	survey	research	elicited	an	urban	illiteracy	rate	of	10%.	Nevertheless,	illiteracy	
rates	are	much	higher	outside	the	urban	centre	of	Matiguás,	which	explains	the	higher	regional	rate.
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tional setting, was carried out over six months during 2008 and 2009, and mainly consisted 
of in-depth responsive interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). More than 25 representatives from 
different local institutions and organizations were interviewed (see annex I), ranging from con-
sumer group representatives to central institution delegates and from political party secretaries 
to farmer cooperative presidents. The focus of the interviews was predominantly on the percep-
tions of environmental problems, their causes, and proposed solutions, as well as on agro-en-
vironmental externalities and the potential of PES schemes in dealing with these externalities. 
Additionally, several inter-institutional meetings dealing with environmental issues in Matiguás 
were attended. Some of the interviews were taped and verbally transcribed, but most of them 
were noted down during the interview sessions, as this created a more confidential environment. 
The data were analysed using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo[1].
In order to further investigate downstream households’ WTP for improved water 
services, we complemented this research with the quantitative analysis of a split-sample CV 
survey in urban Matiguás. The CV method, in which people are asked hypothetical questions 
about how much a certain externality is worth to them, assesses the monetary value that re-
spondents are willing to pay for changes in the provision of a (hitherto non-marketed) publicly 
provided good, such as most environmental services (Carson, 1999). This method is increasingly 
used in water supply research in developing countries (North and Griffin, 1993; Vásquez et al., 
2009; Whittington et al., 1990). We use this method for ‘valuing’ water services as such while 
also linking it to specific policy scenarios, thereby generating information about their viability 
(Farley and Costanza, 2010: 2063). Prior to survey implementation we also conducted three 
focus group interviews, a pilot survey with a random sample of 32 households, and a number 
of iterations to incorporate feedback and assure respondents’ understanding. In-person sur-
vey interviews were conducted during August 2009 using a geographically-stratified random 
sample of 1,015 households[2] (see annex II for a cadastral map of urban Matiguás), covering 
approximately 44% of total downstream urban households in Matiguás[3]. The surveys were im-
plemented by ten (five female and five male) local university students, who received a four-day 
training before entering the field.
The final version of the survey elicited household responses on the current tap wa-
ter system, water uses and consumption practices. Several questions were also aimed at elic-
iting households’ perceptions on and attitudes towards local environmental degradation and 
entitlements, the existence of upstream-downstream externalities and preferred solutions for 
them. Subsequently, respondents were randomly read one out of four contingent water supply 
improvement scenarios (which were designed on the basis of the earlier qualitative research, 
see section 4.2), and were assigned an additional monthly water fee that also randomly varied 
across the sample. The referendum valuation question (Haab and McConnell, 1998), in which 
respondents had to answer whether they voted in favour or against the proposed scenario (di-
chotomous choice), was used to elicit the household’s WTP in the presented contingent scenario. 
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3.		 The	InsTITuTIonal	ConTexT	of	envIronmenTal	governanCe	In
	 maTIguás
3.1.   Environmental governance in Matiguás
Nicaragua has known a long tradition of centralized command-and-control natural 
resource management, in which the main emphasis has been on the creation of protected areas 
(Barahona, 2001; Ravnborg, 2010). The main actor responsible for environmental management 
at the national level is the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARENA), which 
coordinates its tasks with the Ministry of Agriculture, Ranching and Forestry (MAGFOR), and 
the National Forestry Institute (INAFOR). However, the limited political willingness and capac-
ity of these government agencies to effectively enforce the protected area decrees in the field 
has turned most conservation efforts into ‘paper parks’, where deforestation and natural degra-
dation are steadily continuing. During the ‘90s the deforestation rate in Nicaragua amounted to 
about 117,000 hectares/year (FAO, 2003). The apparent failure of halting deforestation through 
this centralized top-down approach instigated a shift towards decentralisation. Especially after 
the creation of the 1988 Nicaraguan Municipalities Law and its 1997 reforms, environmental 
management was increasingly delegated to the municipal level, with municipalities taking up 
former central competences, though always in coordination with the afore-mentioned central 
institutions. Increasing local competences were, however, never accompanied by sufficient mu-
nicipal budget increases, inhibiting municipalities to effectively take up these competences in 
practice (Larson, 2002). 
Although the estimated deforestation rate has decreased somewhat during 2000-
2005 (from a 1.6% annual deforestation increase in 1990-2000 to a 1.3% annual increase in 
2000-2005) (FAO, 2006), the latest national forest inventory concluded that the current defor-
estation rate in Nicaragua still is above 55,000 ha/year, and it warns of an accelerated forest 
ecosystem degradation observed during the last few years (INIFOM, 2009). These numbers 
reflect how national and local governments have so far failed to halt environmental degradation 
in Nicaragua. Even though it has proven to be very ineffective for various reasons, Nicaragua 
still seems to stick to its traditional approach of restrictive top-down regulations. The most re-
cent manifestations of this restrictive approach are the 2005 Law on Environmental Crimes (Ley 
de delitos ambientales) and the 2006 Law prohibiting the cutting, use, and commercialisation 
of forestry products (Ley de veda forestal). Both laws have created more severe punishments 
(fines and imprisonment) for environmental infractions. They also have complicated the admin-
istrative requirements for ‘legal’ use of trees, resulting in higher timber prices, increased illegal 
cutting and trafficking (mainly by powerful actors), and only very limited positive environmental 
results (Marín et al., 2007).
Our qualitative research confirms that Matiguás forms no exception to this general 
picture. Excessive reliance on poorly-enforced and inadequately-enforceable command-and-
control measures has not succeeded in creating and even less in implementing an effective local 
framework for environmental protection. The presence of national government is very limited; 
the few local delegates of the environmental ministry, for example, do not dispose of any techni-
cal staff while also being responsible for several neighbouring municipalities. To make matters 
worse, the ‘protected’ Quirragua reserve does not possess any forest guards or police officers. 
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This lack of state presence makes environmental governance in Matiguás a de facto command-
without-control approach, which leaves it mostly dependent on local non-state norms and prac-
tices.
The cultural perceptions on land and natural resources also influence how environ-
mental governance is locally embedded, and how it interacts with both formal and informal in-
stitutions (Nygren and Rikoon, 2008). On the one hand, typical of peasant perceptions in areas 
such as Matiguás is that the entitlement to land is related to the –albeit nowadays imaginary- 
act of colonization: i.e. the conquering of the ‘savage and unproductive’ forest land in order to 
make it suitable for agricultural and cattle production. In this context, local farmer perceptions 
view the clearing of forest through hard labour as introducing ‘mejoras’ (improvements) which 
are the foundation of property rights and for which producers logically need to be compensated 
when their land is sold or expropriated, even when it belongs to a protected area (Bastiaensen et 
al., 2006: 15-16). At the same time, the agricultural frontier character implies that the region is 
an ‘institutional barrier quite far from established country infrastructure ... in which there is lit-
tle state presence’ (Baumeister and Fernandez, 2005: 80), and where extensive social networks, 
mutual trust, and security are often absent (Ravnborg, 2010). 
On the other hand, even when Matiguás remains – in both a physical and a cultural 
sense – far removed from the urban society of the capital and the ‘developed’ world, ecological 
messages of endangered species, climate change and increasing pressure on water and forest 
resources have found their way to local cultural arenas, mainly through schools, radio and tel-
evision and the discourse of some development organizations, in particular in the urban areas. 
At the same time the traditional top-down approach to environmental management in Nicara-
gua has created the general perception among rural and urban communities of environmental 
conservation as an almost militaristic engagement (see also Ravnborg, 2010). Narratives on 
environmental degradation are often linked to the ‘malicious’ and ‘forest-destroying’ farmers 
who should be disciplined by the use of permits and confiscation of chain saws, and by punishing 
them with fines or even imprisonment as if they were some kind of eco-terrorists. In a certain 
way the incapacity of the authorized institutions to effectively ‘control’ farmers has strength-
ened the narrative among urban dwellers that farmers have a bad ‘moral and environmental 
consciousness’ and that their ‘economic selfishness’ negatively affects the common good. The 
INAFOR delegate perfectly summarizes this common narrative by stating that ‘Farmers are for-
ests’ biggest enemies, they perceive trees as a plague’. 
This set-up is further compounded by political frictions that complicate coordination 
between central and local government institutions. As Nicaragua is characterised by a historical 
political divide (and previous armed struggle) between ‘leftist’ Sandinistas and ‘rightist’ liberals, 
cooperation and coordination between the liberal local government of Matiguás and the Sandi-
nista ministries prove very difficult and result in very limited cooperation[1]. Furthermore, within 
each of the factions, vertical-authoritarian governance continues to prevail (Broegaard, 2009). 
Patron-client relationships, where only a few leading actors (patron-gatekeepers) mediate in-






InstItutIonal EmbEddEdnEss of local WIllIngnEss to Pay for EnvIronmEntal sErvIcEsIob dIscussIon PaPEr 2010-04 • 15
thereby dominate and manipulate local collective action (or inaction), also dominate govern-
ance in Matiguás, and even more when we are dealing with more isolated, precariously accesible 
spaces like the Quirragua mountain area. All these conditions fuel mutual distrust, widespread 
opportunistic behaviour as well as the prevalence of double standards and deep-rooted pes-
simism about the possibility to break the negative, non-cooperative and non-rule abiding dy-
namics typical of vertical patron-client governance (Putnam et al., 1993). Urban dwellers’ lack 
of faith in the potential of state governance mechanisms in restraining farmers from further en-







3.2.   A shift towards alternative policy measures?
Despite the continued emphasis on failing command-and-control measures, the 
urgent need of effective environmental policies has also stimulated a few complementary ini-
tiatives with the aim of improving environmental conditions in Matiguás. The municipality, for 
example, recently issued a local regulation exempting land owners from property taxes on for-
ested parts of their land, hoping that farmers would be motivated to leave the forested parts of 
their property untouched. In practice, however, this measure has had only very limited effects, 
mainly because property taxes on ‘developed’ land are already very low, and –due to a lack of 
control mechanisms- most farmers currently do not even pay property taxes on any land, for-
ested or not. The high administrative barriers to apply for the tax exemption have so far further 
restricted the practical applicability of this measure. 
Local authorities have also focused on reforestation projects, mainly by investing 
in a so-called vivero forestal (tree farm), in which trees are planted and developed in order to of-
fer farmers the opportunity to buy seeds at low cost and reforest their farms. This initiative has 
also had very limited results. Indeed, the initiative has so far clearly failed to take into account 
the underlying drivers of deforestation, and has wrongly assumed that farmers do not reforest 
merely because they do not possess the resources to do so, neglecting the fact that reforestation 
or forested land use are mostly not interesting options for them, even if they are offered trees ‘for 
free’. The former examples –though not classifiable as strict regulatory approaches- again show 
how local initiatives fail to induce any significant changes as they always revert to top-down ap-
proaches and fail to be part of a broader and coherent environmental policy, in which the percep-
tions and needs of the most important actors (i.e. the farmers), are also taken into account. 
3.3.   Failing environmental governance as a local momentum for PES?
If the emphasis on top-down regulations has so far failed to trigger effective en-
vironmental governance in Matiguás, at the same time, one of the most directly felt impacts of 
poor upstream environmental governance is the state of water resources in downstream urban 
Matiguás. The presence of 60 farmer households and their agricultural practices in the upstream 
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Quirragua area is locally considered to be the main threat to urban water supply by the residents 
of urban Matiguás. Our survey results showed that on average, households have about 14.2 
hours of daily water connection during the dry season and about 3.8 hours of water connec-
tion during the rainy season, when heavy rainfall often results in inundations and sedimentation, 
obliging the water company to shut down the filtration and supply system. Households also per-
ceive water quality problems; about 85% of households think tap water is polluted and almost 
50% of households improve tap water before using it, mainly by adding chlorine or boiling it.
At the same time, more than 91% of respondents think Matiguás is struggling with 
deforestation problems, and about all respondents think that rivers in Matiguás are currently 
contaminated. The majority of respondents (67%) believe local water resources are badly pro-
tected, and about 70% think farmers are not protecting water resources on their farm. Our sur-
vey also elicited that 78% and 86% of downstream respondents consider that agricultural activ-
ities in the upstream area have negative effects on respectively water quantity and quality, and 
about 75% think that the negative effects of poor upstream watershed protection mainly affect 
urban dwellers. Furthermore, 87% and 85% of respondents affirm that reforestation of the up-
stream watershed would result in an increase of water quantity and quality respectively. Finally, 
Figure 2 shows that about 66%/73% of urban households think the best way to improve water 
quality/quantity in Matiguás is to invest in ecosystem protection, rather than in improvements 
of the existing water supply infrastructure (pipe system, tanks and filters). For the framing of the 
latter question –which was based on former qualitative research- we refer to annex III.































It is exactly in this context of clearly perceived externalities from upstream activi-
ties, easily identifiable ES users, and failing regulatory policies that PES advocates advertise 
the idea of introducing direct incentives to upstream farmers in order to initiate or improve wa-
tershed management (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2002; Wunder, 2005). The idea of PES 
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is not completely new in Matiguás. The concept was first introduced in the region when one of 
the main GEF-World Bank funded PES pioneering projects in Latin America initiated its activities 
in several rural communities of Matiguás (Pagiola et al., 2007; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 
2010a). The project started in 2002 and terminated in 2008, and was aimed at promoting sil-
vopastoral practices in degraded pasture areas through payments for environmental services 
(generated by these practices) and technical assistance (Vaessen and Van Hecken, 2009). Farm-
ers in the neighbouring Quirragua region, an area that was excluded from the project, have in-
creasingly taken over the project narrative and even organized themselves by starting a local 
conservation foundation, whose main aim is to attract (international) funds to invest in eco-
system payments to Quirragua farmers. So far, however, the foundation has not succeeded in 
attracting any funds. 
Although local government, NGOs and Quirragua farmer cooperatives are interest-
ed in implementing a local watershed PES scheme to solve water-related environmental prob-
lems, nothing guarantees however a priori that residents are willing to pay or contribute to the 
conservation bill. Complementary understanding of household preferences and the factors that 
influence their WTP may provide important inputs into the planning process and the possible 
role of PES transfer mechanisms.
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4.	 loCal	WTp	for	Improved	WaTershed	servICes
In this section we will investigate how much people in Matiguás are willing to pay 
in order to improve their water supply and how this could be linked with the necessary invest-
ments in infrastructure and/or ecosystem services, the latter through a PES system. We will 
analyse this by using split-sample CV scenarios, which allow us to compare WTP for ecosys-
tem scenarios with infrastructural scenarios. Furthermore, through the statistical analysis we 
can further investigate which potential factors influence demand-side acceptance or rejection 
of locally-financed PES programs. First we will briefly present some basic socio-demographic 
characteristics of the sample households. Then we will explain the CV scenarios, and the empiri-
cal model that underlies the approach. Finally, we will present the main results of three model 
specifications.
4.1.   Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents
The main socio-demographic data collected during the interviews are summarized 
in table 1. It shows that about 75% of respondents are female, which should not be much of a 
surprise because it is mainly women that stay at home during labour hours, when most of our in-
terviews took place. The average respondent is about 39.5 years old, and has been living about 
25 years in the urban part of Matiguás. The average education level is low, about 7 years, which 
corresponds to finishing the first grade of secondary school. Almost 10% of respondents are illit-
erate. Household size varies between 1 and 19 members, with an average of almost 5 members. 
On average, 1.8 household members are currently working, and the average reported aggregate 
monthly income of a household amounts to about 2,947 C$ (Nicaraguan Cordobas; at the time 
of fieldwork, August 2009, 1 US$ was equivalent to 20.5 C$), equivalent to approximately 144 
US$. Only 22.7% of urban households reported to be involved in agricultural or cattle activities.
Table 1. Socio-demographic data respondents urban Matiguás
Continuous and interval variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Respondent’s age (in years) 1015 39.47 14.06 15 95
Respondent’s time living in Matiguás (in years) 1015 25.04 15.11 0.25 74
Respondent’s level of education (in years) 1004 7.17 4.52 0 17
Total number of household members 1013 4.78 2.28 1 19
Total number of household members with job 1015 1.77 1.24 0 9
Aggregate household income (in C$/month) 886 2946.95 2788.85 0 >15000
Categorical variables
Variable Obs. Percentage
Respondent’s sex is female 1012 75
Household owns house 1015 89
Respondent knows how to read and write 1015 90
Household involved in agricultural or cattle activities 1007 23
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4.2.   Contingent valuation scenarios
In order to assess WTP for specific water improvement policies, each respondent 
was randomly confronted with one out of four (two-by-two) contingent valuation scenarios 
(Table 2), for which the exact phrasing of all scenarios can be found in annex IV. Half of the 
respondents were presented a scenario in which the proposed project would improve water sup-
ply infrastructure (pipe system, tanks and filters), which would result in the supply of more and 
better water. The other half of the respondents were presented a scenario in which improve-
ment of the water supply would be realised by transferring a monthly payment to upstream 
farmers in the Quirragua area, under the condition that the latter would not contaminate the 
river with fertilizers or pesticides, dead animals and animal excrements, and would stop cutting 
trees close to the river. In both infrastructure and PES scenarios, respondents were told that 
the project would lead to a situation in which they would have safe-to-drink tap water, without 
any interruptions. As decentralisation of public services provision and environmental manage-
ment is high on the agenda in Nicaragua (Larson, 2002), the CV assessment also controlled for 
an intermediary[1]/administration variable. Half of the respondents in both scenarios were told 
that the improved water system would continue to be administered by the current departmental 
water company, while the other half was told that administration would be transferred to the 
municipality of Matiguás. Furthermore, all respondents were told that in order to finance the 
proposed project, every household would have to pay an additional monthly fee, which would 
be added to the current tap water bill. According to our survey results, the average monthly 
tap water bill amounts to about 115 C$[2]. The proposed additional fee randomly varied across 
sample households, ranging from 20 to 180 C$, with an interval of 20 C$[3]. Respondents were 
then asked whether they would vote in favour of or against the proposed project. Of the 1,015 
households interviewed in urban Matiguás, 978 answered the CV question (see Table 2). 
Table 2.  Contingent valuation scenarios used in urban Matiguás surveys
Type of improvement










































Note: Average fee presented to respondents is expressed in Nicaraguan C$ (1 US$ is equivalent to about 20.5 C$, as of August 2009).
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4.3.   Model specifications
Following the standard CV approach it can be assumed that households will be 
willing to pay for improved water services up to the extent that this improvement compensates 
for the loss in benefits derived from such payment. One can further expect that WTP is a function 
of specific household’s attributes and perceptions. In this study, the WTP function is assumed to 
follow a log-linear form: 
LNWTP	=	Xβ	+	e					(1)
where LNWTP represents the natural logarithm of household’s WTP for a change 
in water services. X is a vector of covariates including treatment variables (indicating different 
improvement and administration scenarios), household income, respondent’s perceptions, and 
other relevant household characteristics. β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and e is 
the stochastic error term.   
The referendum approach used in this study does not allow for direct observation 
of WTP. However, LNWTP can be indirectly identified given that respondents are expected to 
provide a favourable answer to the referendum voting question only if the household’s WTP is 
greater than or equal to the fee presented in the contingent scenario. This is possible due to the 
equivalence between the probability of favourable responses and the probability that LNWTP is 
greater than or equal to the natural logarithm of the fee presented to respondents in the refer-
endum question (LNFEE). That is:
P(Vote	=	Yes)	=	P(LNWTP	>	LNFEE)	=	P(Xβ+e	>	LNFEE)	=	P(e	>	LNFEE-Xβ)				(2)
On the assumption that the stochastic error term in equation 1 follows a logistic 
distribution, the error term in equation 1 can be scaled using a parameter K that is related to the 
standard deviation of the error term (i.e.  ) (Cameron, 1988). As a result, the fol-
lowing equivalence is obtained: 
P(Vote=Yes)	=	P(e/K	≥	LNFEE/K	–	Xβ/K)					(3)
Thus,  when  estimating  logistic  regressions  based  on  the  referendum  voting  re-
sponses, we observe that the estimated coefficient of LNFEE will be an estimate of 1/K. Simi-
larly, the estimated coefficients of X are estimates of β/K. Therefore, the direct WTP parameters 
from equation 1 can be calculated by consecutively dividing the estimated coefficients of the 
independent variables by the estimated coefficient of LNFEE and by switching the sign of this 
resulting parameter.  
Table 3 depicts the description and summary statistics of the variables used to es-
timate equation 1. The dependent regression variable VOTE has value one for respondents that 
voted in favour of the proposed scenario, and zero for those who voted against. LNFEE reflects 
the natural logarithm of the randomly assigned fee in the scenario, and is expected to have a 
negative coefficient, as a higher fee is assumed to lower the probability of approving the pro-
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posed project (incentive compatibility). The covariate vector (i.e. X) includes the dummy variable 
ECO which indicates the two approaches to improve water services according to the split-sam-
ple design. The estimated coefficient is expected to be positive if respondents are willing to pay 
more for the PES scenario than for investments in infrastructure, and negative if the opposite is 
true. The dummy variable CITY indicates whether the improved water system would continue to 
be administered by the current departmental water company (CITY=0), or would be transferred 
to the municipality of Matiguás (CITY=1). The variable INCOME is also included and we expect 
tap water to be a normal good (i.e. βINCOME > 0). Since an improved tap water system would in-
crease the substitutability between tap and more expensive purified water, households that 
currently spend a higher amount of money on buying purified water (PUREBILL) are expected 
to report a higher WTP for both scenarios. Another household characteristic we included is the 
respondent’s years of education (EDU). No specific hypothesis is made on the effect of this char-
acteristic on WTP. Respondents who believe that the project is feasible in practice are expected 
to report a higher WTP (i.e. βFEASIBLE > 0).  
Table 3.  Variables description and summary statistics for all observations
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
VOTE Respondent’s vote in the CV scenario (1 = in favour; 0 = against) 0.55 0.50
LNFEE Natural logarithm of the additional fee charged for water service 
improvement in the CV scenario
4.42 0.67
ECO Respondent is presented the payments for ecosystem services 
scenario in the CV scenario (1 = PES scenario; 0 = infrastructure 
scenario)
0.50 0.50
CITY Respondent is presented the decentralization scenario (transfer of 
water administration to municipality) (1 = municipality adminis-
tration; 0 = current water company administration)
0.50 0.50
INCOME Aggregate household income in C$/month 2946.95 2788.85
PUREBILL Household’s weekly expenditure on purified (bottled) water in C$ 27.46 60.41
EDU Education of respondent (in years of schooling) 7.17 4.52
FEASIBLE Respondent thinks the proposed project could be implemented in 
Matiguás (1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.82 0.38
URBANEXT Respondent thinks that mainly urban people of Matiguás will 
experience bad consequences of no environmental protection in 
upstream catchment (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
0.75 0.43
RIVERBAD Respondent thinks that water resources in Matiguás are badly 
protected (1 = badly protected; 0 = otherwise)
0.67 0.47
In order to investigate possible relationships between respondents’ perceptions of 
environmental externalities and their WTP, we included two additional variables. It could be 
expected that RIVERBAD, which has value one if the respondent thinks that water resources in 
Matiguás are currently poorly protected, has a positive coefficient in the ecosystem scenarios 
since the perception of poor protection would motivate the respondent to vote in favour of a PES 
project. The same reasoning applies to URBANEXT, which reflects the respondent’s perception 
on which stakeholder group is highest affected by poor environmental protection. Respondents 
thinking that the most affected group are urban people like themselves can be expected to have 
a higher probability of voting in favour of the PES project. 
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4.4.   Estimation results
Based on the split-sample approach, the regression results are analysed through 
the use of three models (see Table 4). Model 1 uses the pooled sample (all observations) and 
assesses whether there is a different WTP for infrastructure versus ecosystem (PES) scenarios. 
Models 2 and 3 only use the observations for respondents that were presented the infrastruc-
ture (ECO=0) and ecosystem (ECO=1) scenario respectively. They allow us to analyse the po-
tential role that specific variables play in respondents’ WTP for a specific policy scenario. Ta-
ble 4 shows the results for the different models. The first column of every model displays the 
‘raw’ logit results, while the second column displays the WTP parameters, obtained through the 
transformations explained above. 






























































































































Observations 751 377 374
Log likelihood -442.71 -209.47 -226.92
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.158 0.124
AIC 905.43 436.94 471.85
BIC 951.64 472.33 507.16
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard errors.
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The estimated coefficients on LNFEE are negative and significant at the 1% level 
throughout all the models and confirm the incentive compatibility assumption (Carson and 
Groves, 2007). The estimated coefficient of ECO in the pooled data model is negative and highly 
significant, clearly indicating respondents’ higher WTP in infrastructure scenarios. This result is 
unexpected, as we also found that the majority of respondents preferred investing in upstream 
ecosystem protection, rather than in infrastructural improvements (see section 3.3). We will dis-
cuss this important finding below. The estimated coefficients on CITY are negative in all models, 
but statistically insignificant. Apparently, households have no significantly different WTP for dif-
ferent administration levels. Similarly, household income seems to have no effect on WTP for 
improved water services. The coefficient of PUREBILL is positive and significant throughout the 
models, confirming our substitutability hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for EDU are posi-
tive, but never significant. Households that believe that the project implementation is feasible 
in Matiguás report a significant higher WTP in all models. This suggests that respondents who 
believe that the survey will have real policy consequences tend to report higher WTP (Herriges et 
al., 2010). Finally, we also find that the URBANEXT and RIVERBAD coefficients are insignificant 
in model 1 and 2. Nevertheless, and in contrast to our intuitive hypotheses, these coefficients 
are negative and significant in the ecosystem model. The estimated negative URBANEXT coeffi-
cient in model 3 is a clear indication that respondents perceiving themselves as most affected by 
poor upstream protection have a lower WTP for PES projects. Similarly, respondents who think 
water resources in Matiguás are at present poorly protected have a lower WTP for a PES project 
that would precisely improve watershed protection.[1] Again, we will discuss these counterintui-
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5.		 dIsCussIon
The CV exercise demonstrates that respondents express a higher WTP under an 
infrastructure improvement scenario than under a PES approach. This result is surprising espe-
cially since -as reported above- a large majority of urban residents identified the negative exter-
nalities of upstream agricultural activities and the lack of environmental governance to control 
them as the main reasons for their poor water services. They also (and logically) expressed a 
preference for upstream ecosystem protection over infrastructure improvements as a solution 
to their water problems. The results for model 3 confirm and deepen these puzzling results, as 
the WTP for water under a PES program is not higher, but lower among respondents that (i) are 
most aware of environmental externalities and (ii) perceive these externalities as mainly affect-
ing the urban downstream population, to which respondents themselves belong. 
In order to explain these seemingly incoherent choices, we believe it is necessary 
to qualify the assumptions underlying most CV studies. The CV method is often criticised for 
essentially methodological reasons, such as hypothetical and strategic bias[1] (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989; Murphy and Stevens, 2004). But the method has also provoked critiques from a 
more epistemological point of view, mainly related to its underlying utilitarian train of thought 
and corresponding interpretation of the results. Various authors have emphasised that environ-
mental or public values cannot be ‘captured’ on a model of individual preferences (Sagoff, 1988), 
and that the CV approach wrongly confuses values with preferences (Sagoff, 1988; Keat, 1997). 
Indeed, if we would apply the assumption of strict individual rationality and stable, independent 
preferences underlying individuals’ decision making to our case in Matiguás, then standard CV 
theory prescribes that respondents should have a similar WTP under both scenarios, as the end 
product -i.e. the utility of consuming clean and regular tap water- is the same. Furthermore, in 
line with a Coasean negotiation approach, one would expect that urban residents’ perception 
that environmental governance is more critical for the urban water provision would result in a 
higher WTP under the PES scenario. Yet, this is not the case. 
As indicated by North (1990: 18-19) human motivation is more complex than a 
simple version of the neo-classical model of individual utility maximisation. It is based upon 
imperfect, subjective and partially collectively informed cognitive models as well as inherited 
social routines, which underlines the crucial role that institutions play in the choices that indi-
viduals make (see also Williamson, 1985). These general principles give us some way to explain 
the apparent inconsistencies of individual preferences that we observe in our WTP results. More 
importantly, they also allow us to link them with characteristics of the (not necessarily coherent 
and articulated) cultural repertoire of the local institutional environment that informs human 
perceptions and individual decision making (Vatn, 2009). In particular, we believe that framing 
effects, which occur because the CV scenarios get connected to particular discursive parts of 
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The framing effect is not merely a matter of the wording and context of the survey 
questions (which is rightly of great concern in CV studies, see e.g. Schuman and Presser, 1981), 
but more importantly it refers to how the CV scenario is contextualised within the institutional 
background of local society, particularly when it introduces new rules and forms of transaction 
in the existing institutional framework (O’Neill, 1997). Therefore, to make sense of our CV find-
ings, we attempt to assess our results against the local institutional background of narratives 
and practices in Matiguás. Our qualitative research findings offer two possible explanations for 
the observed results. The first is concerned with fairness considerations about the PES, indicat-
ing that prevailing urban ideas about farmers’ entitlements reject the switch from a negative to 
a positive externality framework. The second complementary explanation is related to the lack 
of mutual trust and widespread opportunism under prevailing patron-client governance which 
tends to undermine the credibility of the transactions in the PES framework.
5.1.   Externalities, entitlements and fairness
The PES approach has gained a lot of attention in policy circles as it breaks away 
from the perception of economic actors as perpetrators of negative externalities, and instead 
focuses on the potential positive services these actors could provide to society (Gómez-Bagget-
hun et al., 2010; Pagiola et al., 2002; Wunder, 2005). Much of the dominant PES literature im-
plicitly assumes that this ‘externality switch’ can be perceived as something ‘natural’, or at most 
as a mere technicality, and therefore little further attention is dedicated to the implications of 
this assumption (Salzman, 2005; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010b; Vatn, 2010). The cat-
egorisation of externalities is, however, not a mere technical issue (Vatn and Bromley, 1997). In 
line with Salzman (2005: 960) we believe it ‘turns less on biophysical measures or ecological 
modelling than on [society’s] sense of what the allocation and definition of entitlements ought 
to look like and how they should change over time’. In other words, in order to understand and 
assess the possibilities of new policy instruments and their potential embeddedness in the local 
socio-institutional context, it is important to explore society’s perceptions of entitlements. 
In section 3 we already discussed how environmental governance in Matiguás has 
been mainly limited to top-down regulatory approaches, which depart from the perspective that 
farmers should be ‘disciplined’ in taking care of the environment. An implicit but very present 
assumption of this approach is the consideration of farmers as producers of negative externali-
ties. Most urban dwellers perceive farmers’ practices as ‘harming nature’ with negative conse-
quences for society and due to the context of ineffective and unjust rule enforcement, they think 
that –as one respondent aptly expressed- ‘farmers have gone unpunished for their depredation 
of natural resources for too long’. This message has been further institutionalized through the 
global ecological discourse on connections between deforestation and climate change, which 
have progressively entered the local cultural arena.  As explained by the presenter of a local en-
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The sudden introduction of a new mechanism that largely contradicts these domi-
nant perceptions generates a new and hitherto unfamiliar framework of reference. Instead of 
obliging farmers to protect water resources on their property (a preferred solution by 98% of 
survey respondents) and fining farmers for bad environmental custody (preferred by 96.8% of re-
spondents), urban households would now be obliged to compensate farmers for refraining from 
‘bad’ land use practices. This change results in reluctance among respondents to pay farmers 
for the ES that they could provide, as farmers are precisely expected to take measures against 
harm. The proposed paradigm shift would implicitly allow farmers to demand compensations 
for actions they are deemed to undertake as responsible caretakers, and thereby implicitly pre-
sumes an unrestricted private property right over land and resources of the individual owners. 
This claim is however not self-evident as property rights will typically be restricted by a number 
of state and non-state rules of entitlements (Merlet, 2007). The majority of urban households 
(66% of respondents), indeed believes that farmers have a limited entitlement over privately-
owned land, restraining them from exercising whatever activity they want on their property.
This is compatible with the CV results which demonstrate that –though both infra-
structure and ecosystem scenarios imply the flow of financial resources out of the respondents’ 
pockets to other actors- households clearly prefer the additional fee going to infrastructure in-
vestments, although they previously stated they deem investments in upstream ecosystems as 
more urgent (section 3.3). In other words, they attach a negative premium to rewarding the de-
stroyers of natural resources for their destruction. The same reasoning applies to the negative 
coefficient of RIVERBAD in the PES scenarios. It reflects that it is precisely downstream house-
holds that are most aware of farmers’ production of negative externalities who are least eager 
to reward farmers for the conservation actions that they are deemed to undertake out of moral 
and social duty. One explanation is that they perceive this as unfair. One urban dweller stated 
to consider it ‘unfair asking us to pay farmers for taking care of their property, as in fact, they 
are already legally obliged to do this’, and other respondents expressed that they ‘don’t care 
paying more for tap water, as long as the money does not go to the [Quirragua] farmers’. This 
is also reflected by the negative sign of the URBANEXT coefficient, indicating that respondents 
who perceive they are the main stakeholders affected by poor upstream protection are precisely 
more reluctant to pay upstream farmers. 
In short, the idea of paying farmers for avoiding environmental degradation seems 
incompatible with at least part of the local discursive repertoire which has mainly focused on 
one-sided obligations for farmers, with only very limited emphasis on broader societal respon-
sibilities. Moreover, the physical distance and the absence of any significant negotiation spaces 
has led to a situation in which most upstream-downstream interactions from the upstream side 
are ‘monopolised’ by only a handful of absentee landowners, living in the urban centre, but pos-
sessing large amounts of land in the Quirragua area[1]. These better-off farmers are generally 
the (only) ones that are attending meetings in representation of the interests of all Quirragua 
farmers, and the ones that act as the gatekeepers for upstream communities and thereby further 
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ent expressed a disenchantment with ‘how the lives of ten thousand people in the urban centre 
are disturbed by only three farmers up there’, and another further specified his indignation by 
stating that he is ‘not prepared to pay these rich farmers who on top of that are themselves 
living and drinking tap water in urban Matiguás’. Sommerville et al. (2010: 1263) argue that 
‘perceptions of unfairness can undermine the effectiveness of incentives that provide apparent 
net benefits ... at the individual scale [and] can have a substantial impact on the participation 
of the wider community and thus the efficacy of an intervention’. Game theoretical experiments 
have also shown that parties often prefer no deal to a deal they think is unfair, even if the deal 
would leave them better off (Oosterbeek et al., 2004, as cited by Markandya, 2009: 1147). The 
evidence of our case indeed suggests that in Matiguás ideas and emotions about the unfairness 
of PES, even when offering clear win-win perspectives, is nevertheless rejected by part of the 
urban population.
5.2.   Trust and credibility of the PES framework
The lack of any representative and multi-stranded upstream-downstream consul-
tation platform where different stakeholders are able to analyze, discuss and negotiate different 
interests and perspectives of perceived natural resource problems and agree on action strategies 
(Ravnborg and Guerrero, 1999: 264) has resulted in very limited cooperation between upstream 
and downstream actors. The mainly negative messages regarding upstream farmers emanate 
both from the existing restrictive regulatory framework as from the way this framework is lo-
cally interpreted and translated to dominant discourses in downstream Matiguás. On the other 
hand, and from the upstream perspective, farmers feel they are mainly marginalized by broader 
society, carrying a burden of high expectations, without receiving any support or acknowledge-
ment for the activities they are deemed to exercise or to abstain from. This upstream perspective 







Typical in regions such as Matiguás is indeed that the municipal budget is almost 
entirely invested in urban areas, often resulting in very few resources flowing to rural communi-
ties (Larson, 2002), precisely because they are often under-represented in policy-making.
Upstream farmers and downstream urban dwellers are apparently ‘trapped’ in a 
collective action problem with a socially-suboptimal Nash equilibrium as they do not manage 
to overcome the stalemate of individual non-cooperative strategies despite clear opportunities 
for win-win scenarios (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). In particular, the above-mentioned 
governance deficiencies of inherited patron-client structures, leading to pervasive mutual dis-
trust and widespread opportunism as well as the tensions concerning the fairness of transac-
tions with richer patron-actors, undermine the credibility of the PES framework. Many urban 
respondents simply do not believe that it will be possible to implement and effectively enforce 
the conditionality of the payments. Statements such as ‘Why would farmers suddenly start pro-
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tecting the environment, if in the past 20 years they never have done so?’ or ‘How can we be 
sure that our money will really go to environmental improvements?’ clearly reflect the worries 
of urban dwellers. In this context it is not surprising that urban dwellers rather prefer paying 
for infrastructural improvement, possibly coupled with renewed and intensified efforts at gov-
ernment control of the upstream area, instead of paying farmers for an insecure or even quite 
improbable outcome.
At the same time, we should bear in mind that conservation success is not only de-
pendent on providing tangible and individual benefits to individual farmers, but is mainly ‘con-
tingent on developing positive local attitudes’ (Struhsaker et al., 2005, as cited by Sommerville 
et al., 2010: 1263). But a more important and first step in developing these positive local atti-
tudes in Matiguás should be centred on breaking the existent negative vicious circle of distrust, 
through the promotion of processes that facilitate the creation of multi-stranded platforms for 
negotiating and coordinating collective action between upstream and downstream (institution-
al) actors. The importance of these platforms and the factors that facilitate or restrict collective 
action have been the subject of extensive inquiry during the last two decades, especially after 
Ostrom’s ground-breaking work on governing the commons (Ostrom, 1990). One of the main 
lessons from this research is that actors’ resource management is not only ‘determined by exter-
nal structural forces such as the market or the state ... Rather, it is shaped by the interplay be-
tween such factors and relationships, and individual [actors’] own experiences and perceptions’ 
(Ravnborg and Westermann, 2002: 43). Development of trust through social interaction would 
also increase the level of social control, an element which is extremely important in contexts of 
limited governmental presence. The main initial role of external interventions and organizations 
should then be focused on facilitating the creation of such interaction spaces that enable proc-
esses of perceptual changes related to entitlements and (shared) responsibilities, and therefore 
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6.		 ConClusIon
Our empirical evidence suggests that a Coasean approach to PES, in which society 
would come to an optimal allocation of positive and (avoided) negative externalities through 
negotiation in a market-based framework, could prove difficult to apply in practice. Apparently, 
the mere existence of clearly-defined externalities, which is often seen as one of the main nec-
essary conditions for the creation of PES or PES-like compensation mechanisms (Engel et al., 
2008; Pagiola and Platais, 2007), does not out of itself offer sufficient potential to solve current 
water problems in Matiguás. Our research shows how a Coasean framework to PES falls short 
of capturing a number of essential issues and processes at the local level, and offers a potential 
explanation for respondents’ relatively low WTP in other studies on local demand for watershed 
services (e.g., Johnson and Baltodano, 2004). Our puzzling CV results and our complementary 
qualitative research findings indicate that WTP is not just a matter of individual consumption 
of better and more steadily available water, but that WTP is inextricably connected to percep-
tions about the underlying problems and responsibilities, and therefore inseparable from con-
text-related socio-political factors that are embedded in the local institutional framework (see 
also Corbera et al., 2007b). Not only do different actors assess externalities and the underlying 
entitlements (and perceived fairness) in a different way, but also and perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the absence of mutual trust between different ‘parties’ involved in a possible transaction 
undermines the foundation of market-based tools, as the latter are social constructs that pre-
cisely depend on a minimum level of trust (Cleaver, 2002; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Therefore, 
demand-side studies on the feasibility of (locally-financed) PES mechanisms should not be re-
stricted to mere CV or cost-benefit assessments, but should also encompass broader inquiries 
into their interactions of ‘demand’ (and for that matter also ‘supply) with local social practices 
and associated discourses (so-called deliberative appraisal methods, see Vatn, 2009). We need 
to be aware that each particular ES-market will need to be socially and culturally created and 
sustained. Obviously our study only hinted at some of the socio-political interactions involved. 
Additional studies should help to further clarify this important link and generate insights on 
how appropriate institutional conditions for viable PES systems could be crafted through proc-
esses of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver, 2002) from within and in relation to the existing rep-
ertoires. Insights from political ecology, for example, might offer very useful insights on how 
cultural ‘meanings attached to the environment shape the range of conservation efforts’, and 
‘how efforts targeted at environmental conservation are intrinsically interwoven with questions 
of power and political authority’ (Nygren and Rikoon, 2008: 775). 
The conclusion that a PES system requires adequate institutional embeddedness 
also prompts us to warn against an overenthusiastic promotion and adoption of PES as a ‘mar-
ket-based’ alternative to deficient regulatory, ICDP, or other community-based natural resource 
management approaches, even if all the necessary implementation conditions that Coasean 
PES theory prescribes are met (Pagiola, 2005; Wunder, 2005; Wunder, 2008). This is not to 
say that PES should be discarded as a whole. We think it can play an important complemen-
tary role in conservation policies, but in order to achieve its potential it should be broadened to 
an expanded institutional governance approach to PES (Corbera et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 
2010). Rather than promoting PES as a tool that would correct the inefficient outcomes of regu-
latory or development-based approaches, the latter perspective explicitly considers PES as part 
of an integrated rural governance strategy (Muradian et al., 2010), which takes into account 
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the cognitive-motivational dimensions as well as the social and political relations that shape 
natural resources management (Ravnborg, 2003). Economic transactions such as PES, could 
thus eventually take up a complementary role along the way, but should be carefully embedded 
in the broader institutional context, as they precisely depend on the preliminary development of 
a ‘solid’ social foundation and ‘the social trust on which institutions depend’ (Cleaver, 2002: 27). 
Vatn (2005: 215) perfectly recapitulates the previous discussion by emphasising that ‘choosing 
policy instruments is thus not simply about changing incentives. First of all it is about instituting 
certain logics, about understanding which institutional frames people apply, and about influ-
encing these frames.’
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(We omitted the names of the participants to maintain confidentiality) 
Interview/meeting date Institution/organisation/function
Various occasions between 
02/03/2009 and 17/08/2009
Responsible for environmental management in the Municipality of
Matiguás
Various occasions between 
14/03/2009 and 21/08/2010
Quirragua coffee farmer; President Quirragua farmers’ cooperative;
Co-founder and member of the Quirragua conservation foundation
Various occasions between 
16/03/2009 and 17/08/2009
Various urban dwellers Matiguás (n = 23)
24/03/2009; 02/04/2009 Co-responsible water company (AMAT) Matiguás
24/03/2009; 01/04/2009 Responsible community electricity and water projects in the Municipality 
of Matiguás
24/03/2009 Municipal council member Sandinista Party (FSLN); member of municipal 
environmental commission
25/03/2009 Executive Secretary Sandinista Party (FSLN) Matiguás
25/03/2009; 17/04/2009 President consumers defence organization Matiguás (CENIDH)
25/03/2009 Municipal Forestation Commission (COMUFOR): Inter-institutional
Meeting
25/03/2009 Mayor Matiguás (Liberal Party PLC)
25/03/2009 Public prosecutor environmental crimes
26/03/2009 Local delegate Ministry of Health (MINSA) Matiguás
26/03/2009; 27/03/2009; 
21/04/2009
Municipal council member Liberal Party (PLC); ex-vice mayor Matiguás
26/03/2009; 03/04/2009 Quirragua cattle farmer; Co-founder and secretary Quirragua
conservation foundation
27/03/2009 Local delegate of Ministry of Agriculture, Ranching and Forestry
(MAGFOR) Matiguás
31/03/2009 Responsible water company (AMAT) Matiguás
31/03/2009; 04/04/2009 Radio journalist Matiguás (presenter radio program ‘Protection and
conservation of the environment’); Teacher local secondary school
01/04/2009 People’s Power Councils Meeting (CPC and GPC): Inter-institutional
Meeting 
01/04/2009 Local delegate Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARENA) 
01/04/2009 Local delegate National Forestry Institute (INAFOR)
01/04/2009 President consumers defence organization Matiguás (CPDH)
02/04/2009 Commandant fire department Matiguás
02/04/2009 Police chief Matiguás
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annex	II:
CadasTral	map	of	urban	maTIguás,	used	for	geographICal	random	samplIng




In your opinion, what would be the best way to improve the drinking water quality in Matiguás? 
Investing in improvements of the installations and water equipment of the current water system, 
or investing in improving the protection of the water resources in the [upstream] area of the river 
Cusiles and the Quirragua zone?
In your opinion, what would be the best way to improve the drinking water quantity in Matiguás? 
Investing in improvements of the installations and water equipment of the current water system, 
or investing in improving the protection of the water resources in the [upstream] area of the river 
Cusiles and the Quirragua zone?
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annex	Iv:
phrasIng	of	ConTIngenT	valuaTIon	sCenarIos
Keep in mind that the current water service in Matiguás is frequently interrupted and that water 
is sometimes unsafe to drink. Suppose that the Matiguás residents would have the opportunity 
to vote in favour of or against a project that would improve the current tap water service. 
Scenarios A and B: Infrastructure investments
The project would consist of replacing the current pumps, tanks, pipes, filters, and purification 
system with more advanced technology to collect and treat water from the river Cusiles. The 
new system would collect more water, and would treat the water in order to reduce the levels 
of chemicals and residuals from farmers and farmer communities upstream. Therefore, with the 
new system, you will have tap water that would be totally safe to drink and with good pressure 
24 hours per day, every day of the year, and without any interruptions. 
Scenario A (administration at departmental level):	The	new	system	would	be	administered	
by	the	current	Water	Utility	of	Matagalpa.




Scenario C and D: Ecosystem investments (PES)
The project would consist of establishing a fund which would pay a monthly amount of money to 
the farmers and farmer communities in the upstream area of the river Cusiles and Quirragua, in 
order and under the condition that these farmers would refrain from polluting the river with gar-
bage, washing of clothes, human and animal excrements, fertilizers and pesticides, and would 
not deforest the river banks. The project would increase the water quantity in the river Cusiles 
and would reduce the amount of chemicals and pollution that these upstream farmers currently 
discharge. Therefore, with the new system, you will have tap water that would be totally safe to 
drink and with good pressure 24 hours per day, every day of the year, and without any interrup-
tions. 
Scenario C (administration at departmental level): The project and the payments to the 
farmers would be administered by the current water company as part of the tap water 
service.
Scenario D (administration at municipal level): Furthermore, as part of the project, the wa-
ter service administration would be transferred to the municipality by creating a munici-
pal water utility to be administered by the municipality of Matiguás, which would locally 
manage the water system and the payments to the farmers and the farmer communities.
However, this project would cost money. In order to finance the project, it would be neces-
sary to increase the water bill of all water users in Matiguás. Your water bill would increase by 
an amount of C$ FEE per month, in addition to what you currently pay. Keep in mind that the 
increment of C$ FEE per month that you would pay for the improved water service will not be 
available to purchase other things such as food, clothes and other items needed in your house-
hold. Would you vote in favour of or against the project?
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